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PREREGISTRATION PUBLICITY IN AN
EXCHANGE OFFER
As corporate acquisition by tender offer becomes increasingly
popular,' incumbent managements have sharpened their tactics to pre-
vent a takeover.2 In some instances, their interference with an out-
sider's bid may be not only justified but also obligatory.3 A takeover
poses an imminent threat to management-an outsider acquiring a
majority of the target's stock will seldom be content as a mere investor
but will replace the incumbent management.4 The resourcefulness of
both acquiring corporations and hostile managements in carrying their
fight to the shareholders has led to increased supervision by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC). In 1968, Congress enacted
the William's Bill - amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the 1934 Act) and providing a regulatory scheme of both disclosure
and take-up mechanics for tender offers. But if the acquiring cor-
poration offers its newly issued shares-instead of cash-in exchange
for the target's shares, section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 6 is the
principal provision insuring that the target's stockholders will have
both the time and the accurate information necessary to make an
informed decision. Section 5 (c) prohibits publications deemed offers
to sell or buy securities before a registration statement is filed ' and,
1 The House report accompanying the Williams Bill noted that: "The increased
use of cash tender offers to acquire control of corporations is evidenced by the fact
that in 1966 there were over 100 such offers involving companies with securities listed
on national securities exchanges as compared with eight in 1960." H.R. REP. No.
1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968).
2 Among the defensive tactics available to the management of the target company
are: raising the annual dividend, splitting the stock, increasing the number of shares
outstanding, purchasing stock, effecting an acquisition which would make the position
subsequent to the tender offer contrary to antitrust laws, enacting restrictive charter
provisions and bylaws, issuing a series of preferred stock, and merging defensively.
Schmults & Kelley, Cash Take-Over Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115
(1967) ; see Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements in Con-
testing Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1104 (1969).
3 See, e.g., Schmults & Kelley, supra note 2, at 117-19. Although a takeover bid
is arguably a matter solely between the offeror and the target's shareholders, manage-
ment may believe that the best interest of their shareholders requires their critical
evaluation of the offer and, if they see the offeror as a potential raider, they may
have a fiduciary obligation to oppose the offer.
4 Cf. Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 317, 318 (1967).
5 Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-n (1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§78m-n (Supp. V, 1970) ).
615 U.S.C. §7 7e (1964).
7 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or
medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration
statement has been filed as to such security, or while the registration state-
ment is the subject of a refusal order or stop order or (prior to the effective
date of the registration statement) any public proceeding or examination
under section 77h of this title.
Id. §77e(c). (174)
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in conjunction with section 8(a) of the Act,8 imposes a twenty-day
deliberation period, after registration, before actual trading may begin.
Certain specified information may be given by the offeror to the tar-
get's shareholders prior to filing under SEC rule 135," promulgated
under section 5.
The section 5(c) prohibition of preregistration announcements,
however, may conflict with disclosure specifically required by section
13 (d) of the 1934 Act 'o and generally mandated by rule 10b-5 "1 as
construed in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.' In Chris-Craft Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp.,"3 the Second Circuit recently con-
sidered the scope of permissible preregistration disclosure in the context
of a stock for stock exchange offer. All four opinions in Chris-Craft
recognized the difficulty of reconciling these seemingly inconsistent
provisions, but none suggested a resolution which satisfactorily balances
the policies of prohibiting publications before registration and providing
an opportunity to evaluate a prospectus with those permitting or
requiring certain information for the target's shareholders so that all
investors enter the market with equal knowledge.
I. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp.
As the first step in its plan to acquire Piper Aircraft Corporation
(Piper), a leading manufacturer of light aircraft, Chris-Craft Indus-
tries, Incorporated (Chris-Craft), a diversified manufacturer of recrea-
tional products, began purchasing Piper shares on the open market in
early January 1969. On January 23, Chris-Craft published a cash
tender offer for up to 300,000 shares of Piper stock at 65 dollars per
share. This offer netted 34 percent of the 1,641,890 Piper common
shares issued and outstanding.14 On February 27, Chris-Craft filed
with the SEC a registration statement and proposed prospectus for
an exchange offer for an additional 300,000 shares. A second ex-
change offer was announced on May 7 and became effective on July
24.15
8 Id. § 77h(a).
9 17 C.F.R. §230.135 (1970), quoted at text accompanying note 33 infra.
10 Section 13(d) of the 1934 Act requires any person who acquires equity
securities and, after such acquisition is the owner of more than 10% of that class of
securities, if registered, to file a statement containing the identity of the persons for
whom the shares were acquired, the source of the funds used in the acquisition, the
purpose of the purchase, the number of shares beneficially owned, and information
regarding any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with respect to the shares.
in question. 15 U.S.C. §78m(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
11 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
12401 F2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
13 426 F2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc).
14Id. at 571.
15 Id. A "bit by bit approach" to acquisition has several advantages. It facili-
tates financing, requires a relatively small initial investment, puts pressure on the
incumbent management which may induce it to cooperate, and decreases the number
of shares that need to be acquired in the final bid for control.
1970]
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Piper's Board of Directors viewed with alarm these takeover
attempts, advised their shareholders that the cash bid was inadequate,
and began a series of defensive maneuvers attracting the scrutiny of the
New York Stock Exchange, the SEC, and eventually the courts. 6
While characterizing Chris-Craft's 65 dollar per share bid as
"inadequate" in a letter to Piper shareholders, Piper management
offered 300,000 authorized but unissued shares to Grumman Aircraft
Engineering Corporation at the same price in an attempt to offset any
success Chris-Craft might have gained. The Grumman sale was
never completed, but Piper's announcement of the offer adversely
affected Chris-Craft's initial offer. 18
On March 22, Piper management issued 469,199 authorized but
unissued shares to acquire control of United States Concrete Pipe
Company of Florida and Southply, Incorporated and thereby make
Piper less attractive to Chris-Craft.'9 But Piper's failure to seek the
approval of its shareholders or the New York Stock Exchange before
issuing a significant bloc of shares, as its listing agreement required,
led the Exchange to refuse Piper's listing application, suspend trading
in Piper shares, and authorize delisting proceedings before the SEC.20
In response, Piper rescinded both acquisitions, and trading in Piper
shares resumed.
Following this maneuver, the Piper family, which owned 31 per-
cent of the outstanding shares, resumed negotiations begun early in
January with Bangor Punta Corporation (Bangor Punta), a diver-
sified manufacturer. 2' Negotiations toward a defensive merger led to
an agreement on May 8 under which the Piper family would exchange
its 501,090 shares for certain Bangor Punta securities.' Bangor
16Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 303 F. Supp. 191, 193
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 426 F2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc).
17 Increasing the number of shares outstanding decreases the fractional interest
in Piper comprised by the shares Chris-Craft had acquired or could hope to acquire
from the public. Thus a larger majority of the public would have to tender their
shares in order for Chris-Craft to acquire control, and acquisition of control would
become more expensive. See generally note 2 .supra.
18 303 F. Supp. at 193.
19 Chris-Craft's acquisition of United States Concrete Pipe Company of Florida
through Piper would hardly further its intended expansion in the field of recreational
vehicles. Its acquisition through Piper of Southply, Incorporated, a speedboat manu-
facturer, might violate antitrust laws.
20 The Exchange would normally give consideration to suspending or removing
from the list a security of a company when:
15. Agreements are Violated-Company, its transfer agent or registrar, vio-
lates any of its, or their, listing or other agreements with the Exchange.
2 CCH N.Y. STocK ExcH. GUIDE 112499.20 (1969).
21 A frequent response of incumbent management to a cash take-over bid is to
arrange a merger of the subject company with another corporation more to
its like. Realistically this is not a defense tactic, but rather a form of
orderly retreat, and one would expect that unless such a merger was being
actively considered prior to the tender offer, it would be viewed by incumbent
management only as a last, albeit very effective, resort.
Schmults & Kelley, supra note 2, at 132.
22 426 F2d at 571.
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Punta also agreed to use its best efforts to acquire a majority of the
outstanding shares and, in furtherance of this agreement, to offer
"'Bangor Punta securities and/or cash having a value, in the written
opinion of The First Boston Corporation, of $80 or more'" for each
Piper share still outstanding.23 If Bangor Punta was successful in
acquiring more than 50 percent of Piper's stock and, if on the opening
day of the exchange offer the value of the shares offered to the family
was less than 80 dollars, the compensation paid to the Piper family
was to be increased by any difference between the value of the package
offered the shareholders and 80 dollars per share.24
On May 8, the day after Chris-Craft's last exchange offer was
announced, Piper and Bangor Punta issued identical press releases
announcing their merger agreement. After stating that the Piper
family would receive Bangor Punta securities for their shares, the
release announced:
Bangor Punta has agreed to file a registration statement
with the SEC covering a proposed exchange offer for any
and all of the remaining outstanding shares of Piper Aircraft
for a package of Bangor Punta securities to be valued in the
judgment of The First Boston Corporation at not less than
$80 per Piper share. The registration statement covering all
securities to be issued will be filed as soon as possible and a
meeting of the shareholders of Bangor Punta Corporation
will be called for approval.'-
On May 26, alleging that the May 8 press release constituted an
offer to sell securities before registration in violation of section 5(c)
of the 1933 Act, the SEC brought Piper and Bangor Punta before
the District Court for the District of Columbia. Without admitting
any of the allegations, both defendants consented to the entry of a
23Id.
24303 F. Supp. at 194. The Second Circuit was confused by and misstated this
fact. 426 F.2d at 571.
25426 F2d at 571-72. The release continued:
Mr. Piper said that in view of Bangor Punta's long-standing policy of
maintaining autonomy in the management of its operating companies, and
the similarity of operating philosophies between the two companies, he and
the Piper family would strongly support the merger and would recommend
it to all shareholders.
Mr. Wallace said Bangor Punta welcomed the association with Piper
Aircraft, its world-wide distribution, and its prestigious product name. He
said the consolidation would align the Piper Aircraft name with other lead-
ing Bangor Punta companies, including Smith & Wesson, Starcraft Company,
and Waukesha Motor Company.
Bangor Punta manufactures a wide variety of recreational vehicles in-
cluding sailboats, houseboats, snowmobiles, campers, trailers and motor homes.
A merger of Bangor Punta and Piper Aircraft would bring Bangor Punta
into the light aircraft manufacturing business.
Sales of the combined companies would reach $450,000,000 in fiscal 1969,
with approximately $180,000,000, or 40%, in the aircraft, recreational and
leisure time fields.
Id. at 572.
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permanent injunction barring them, inter alia, from issuing further
releases of a similar nature before Bangor Punta's registration state-
ment was filed.26
Bangor Punta filed its registration statement on May 29, included
with its filing a copy of the May 8 agreement, and sent preliminary
prospectuses to all Piper shareholders of record on the filing date.2 7  Its
offer became effective on July 18 and expired July 29. Chris-Craft's
second exchange offer expired six days later. Neither side had won
a clear victory; Chris-Craft held 40 percent and Bangor Punta 44
percent of Piper's stock.8
Fearing that Bangor Punta's exchange offer, coupled with the
Piper family agreement and private cash purchases, might give its
opponent a majority and thus endanger its investment,2 9 Chris-Craft
on July 22 sought a preliminary injunction requiring Bangor Punta
to offer rescission to Piper shareholders who tendered in response to
its exchange offer, to cease acquisition of further shares, to halt any
merger plans, and to refrain from voting a bloc of 120,200 Piper
shares acquired for cash between May 16 and 23.3" Chris-Craft based
its request upon allegations that the press releases of May 8 violated
section 5(c) of the 1933 Act and rule 135, and sections 9, 10(b),
and 14(e) of the 1934 Act and the rules promulgated thereunder. 3
District court Judge Tenney held that the press release merely
announced that Bangor Punta had agreed to file a registration state-
ment covering its forthcoming exchange offer and could not, on its
face, be construed as an offer to sell securities within the meaning of
section 5 (c).12 He found support for this interpretation in rule 135,
which provides in part that:
(a) For the purposes only of section 5 of the Act, the
following notices sent by an issuer in accordance with the
terms and conditions of this section shall not be deemed to
offer any security for sale:
26 Id. at 572.
7 303 F. Supp. at 195.
28 Id. At the time the case came to argument on appeal, Chris-Craft held 46.2%
of Piper's common stock, while Bangor Punta had acquired a majority with 52.7%.
426 F.2d at 572.
29 If Bangor Punta succeeded in obtaining a majority of Piper stock, Chris-Craft
would lose not only the premium paid for tenders but also find it difficult to liquidate
its investment quickly. Because Piper is a Pennsylvania company, a merger would
require only a simple majority approval. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 802, 1902 (1967),
as amended, (Supp. 1970), and Chris-Craft might well be locked into a permanent
minority position.
30 303 F. Supp. at 192-93.
31 Id. at 196-97. This Comment deals solely with the allegation that the May 8
press release constituted a violation of § 5 of the 1933 Act.
32 Id. at 196.
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(4) In the case of an exchange offering, the name of
the issuer and the title of the securities to be surrendered in
exchange for the securities to be offered, the basis upon which
the exchange is proposed to be made and the period during
which the exchange may be made, or any of the fore-
going . . . .
Judge Tenney construed the "basis upon which the exchange is pro-
posed" phrase to immunize the press release references to the 80
dollar valuation. He concluded:
[T] he precise components which were to comprise the package
of Bangor Punta securities to be offered for each share of
Piper had not been determined at the time of the May 8th
press release, [and] Bangor Punta and Piper could do no
more than set forth the basis upon which the exchange offer
was proposed in the same terms as contained in the May 8th
agreement.3 4
This construction, he believed, was consistent with the New York
Stock Exchange's guidelines for press releases, which prescribe that
announcements "should be definite as to price, ratio, timing and/or
any other pertinent information necessary to permit a reasonable
evaluation of the matter." 35
Judge Tenney also found that after execution of the May 8 agree-
ment, security against premature disclosure of the terms of the agree-
ment could not be maintained."0 Because the 80 dollar figure was
nearly 10 dollars above the market price for Piper shares at that time,s"
those with knowledge of the forthcoming offer could trade with a
substantial advantage over other investors. Thus Judge Tenney be-
lieved that the preregistration disclosure contained in the May 8 press
releases was "both desirable and consonant with the directives of
Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co." 38 In sum,
33 17 C.F.R. §§230.135(a), (c) (4) (1970) (emphasis added).
34 303 F. Supp. at 196.
35
The extent of the disclosures will depend upon the stage of discussion,
studies, or negoations [sic]. So far as possible, public statements should
be definite as to price, ratio, timing and/or any other pertinent information
necessary to permit a reasonable evaluation of the matter. As a minimum,
they should include those disclosures made to "outsiders."
Id. (quoting New York Stock Exchange Company Manual at A-19 (July 19, 1968))
(emphasis supplied by court).
36Id. at 195. It is also possible that, as discussed below, text accompanying
notes 71-72 supra, Bangor Punta was required to file a 13(d) statement. If so,
institutional investors who scrutinize SEC files would be aware of the offer as well
as "insiders" and "tippees." Unlike "insiders" and "tippees," investors whose insight
stemmed only from public documents would be under no obligation to refrain from
trading.
37 Wall St. J., May 8, 1969, at 36, col. 5.
38 303 F. Supp. at 195.
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the district court found no violation of the securities laws by Chris-
Craft's opponents in the struggle for control warranting a preliminary
injunction. Chris-Craft then sought and received an expedited appeal
to the Second Circuit.
In view of Bangor Punta's stipulation that no merger would be
effected and a finding that no other irreparable harm would result if
the injunction were denied,3" the Second Circuit sitting en banc40
affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction. But the court of
appeals took issue with the district court's treatment of section 5 (c)
and rule 135 and its interpretation of Texas Gulf Sulphur. Writing
for the majority, Judge Waterman adopted the construction of the
rule 135 exemption to section 5(c) suggested by Chris-Craft and by
the SEC in its amicus curiae brief.4 The majority held that rule 135
presented an "exclusive checklist" of information not deemed an offer
to sell securities before registration. The press release references to
a package of Bangor Punta securities valued at not less than 80 dollars
were viewed as falling outside the privileged categories.' Judge
Waterman also found the district court's reliance upon Texas Gulf
Sulphur to be misplaced.
The only material fact in this case within the meaning of
Texas Gulf Sulphur was Bangor Punta's commitment to offer
its securities for Piper Aircraft shares. Rule 135 provides
adequately for the announcement of a material fact such as
this; further disclosure would . . . thwart other policies of
the securities laws.
43
The Second Circuit remanded the case for district court determi-
nation of the appropriate remedy in light of their finding of a section
5(c) violation. In his concurring opinion, Judge Moore objected to
this finding because he thought a finding on the merits should await
39 Speaking to the standard for judicial intervention in takeover contests, Judge
Friendly stated:
[T]he participants on both sides act, not "in the peace of a quiet chamber,"
. . . but under the stresses of the market place. They act quickly, some-
times impulsively, often in angry response to what they consider, whether
rightly or wrongly, to be low blows by the other side. Probably there will
no more be a perfect tender offer than a perfect trial. Congress intended to
assure basic honesty and fair dealing, not to impose an unrealistic require-
ment of laboratory conditions . . . .These considerations bear on the kind
of judgment to be applied in testing conduct-of both sides-and also on the
issue of materiality.
Electronic Speciality Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F2d 937, 948 (2d Cir.
1969).
40 In writing for the majority of the Second Circuit in its rehearing en banc,
Judge Waterman substantially reiterated the opinion he wrote for the majority of
a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit in the original hearing. See Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 69-70 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 192,510 (2d Cir.),
aff'd on rehearing, 426 F2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc).
41426 F2d at 574.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 575.
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trial in the district court. He also disagreed with the majority's
finding on the illegality of the press release, reading the offer to sell
exemption of rule 135 as requiring the 80 dollar figure to be disclosed.
Judge Anderson also concurred in the denial of the preliminary in-
junction, but agreed with Judge Lumbard's dissent that the proper
balance between the seemingly conflicting statutory provisions should
be struck in favor of permitting the preregistration information pub-
lished on May 8.45 In short, the court divided because its construction
in Texas Gulf Sulphur of the requirements of disclosure under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act appeared to have so broadened that statute
that at least two judges thought it no longer possible to comply with
both section 10(b) and the restrictions upon disclosure of preregistra-
tion information imposed by section 5 (c) of the 1933 Act.
II. PREREGISTRATION DISCLOSURE: EXCHANGE OFFERS
A. Section 5(c) and Rule 135: The Need for Consistency
Section 5(c) of the 1933 Act provides that it is unlawful to:
offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of
any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration
statement has been filed as to such security.4"
Both the majority and dissent in Chris-Craft agreed that section 5 (c)
is designed to prevent the dissemination of information about a pro-
posed purchase or sale of securities before the registration process
has begun.' "Offer" is broadly defined in section 2(3) of the 1933
Act 48 and construed to include publicity of a corporation's future
plans especially if they include a forthcoming issue of new securities.
49
But the prohibition of section 5(c) is not absolute; rule 135 exempts
4 Id. at 577-78.
45 Id. at 578-79.
4615 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1964).
47Under § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, no offers are permitted prior to
registration. After filing of a registration statement but before its effective date,
no sales are permitted, and written offers are permitted only in the form of a pre-
liminary prospectus or of a "tombstone" advertisement. After the registration state-
ment is effective, sales are permitted, and offers are restrained only by antifraud
provisions. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4697 (May 28, 1964). In reference to
the preregistration period, the release also provides that:
These principles, however, are not intended to restrict the normal communi-
cation between an issuer and its stockholders or the announcement to the
public generally of information with respect to important business and finan-
cial developments. Such announcements are required in the listing agreements
used by stock exchanges, and the Commission is sensitive to the importance
of encouraging this type of communication. In recognition of this require-
ment of certain stock exchanges, the Commission adopted Rule 135, which
permits a brief announcement of proposed rights offerings, proposed exchange
offerings, and proposed offerings to employees as not constituting an offer
of a security for the purposes of section 5 of the Act.
Id.; see 1 L. Loss, SECuRITrEs REGULATIoN 179-80 (1961).
48 See 15 U.S.C. §77b(3) (1964).
49 SECv. Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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from the definition of offer as used in that section certain information
concerning a proposed offering to the issuer's shareholders or the
shareholders of another corporation. 50 Even announcement of the
specific information permitted by rule 135 is subject to certain time
restraints, 51 must state that the offering will be made only by means
of a prospectus,5 2 and, in the case of an exchange offer, may include
only "the name of the issuer and the title of the securities to be
surrendered in exchange for the securities to be offered, [and] the
basis upon which the exchange [of securities] is proposed to be
made." " The timing of the May 8 release and the shadow it cast
upon Chris-Craft's offer demonstrate how rule 135 might undercut
section 5 (c) and place an additional weapon, the early announcement
of a rival exchange offer by a friendly corporation, into the arsenal
of incumbent management.
When a corporation offers its newly issued securities to the public
for cash, the statutory scheme envisioned by section 5 (c) 54 prevents
those privy to unannounced corporate information as well as the
uninformed public from trading until a registration statement is filed
and becomes effective."' But when newly issued shares are offered in
exchange for presently traded securities, section 5 (c) cannot prevent
either group from trading in target shares before the registration
process is complete. Trading is not deferred but merely transferred
from the unavailable to the freely traded securities. In the context
of an exchange offer, target shares become rights to acquire the
offeror's unissued securities. If trading in target shares is not to
be halted whenever an exchange offer is planned, the most feasible
solution is to permit announcement of the forthcoming offer but impose
strict controls on the scope and kind of preregistration publicity,
thereby affording all traders equal access to the relevant information.
Insofar as rule 135 effectuates this solution by permitting distribution
of basic information necessary to diminish the opportunity for unfair
advantage to insiders and to quash inaccurate information, it furthers
the statutory scheme of section 5(c).56 Insofar as it perpetuates the
advantage of insiders or adds to uninformed trading, it is destructive
of those ends.
Bangor Punta's press release unquestionably contained more in-
5017 C.F.R. §230.135 (1970).
51 Although the point was not raised, Bangor Punta's May announcement pre-
ceded the effective date of the offer by 71 days and thus violated § (B) of rule 135,
17 C.F.R. §230.135(b) (1970), which forbids notice to be given more than 60 days
prior to the proposed date of the offering. The 60-day provision has since been
deleted by the SEC. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5101 (Nov. 19, 1970).
5217 C.F.R. § 230.135(c) (1970).
531d. § 230.135 (c) (4).
54 Note 47 supra.
55 See 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1964) (how and when a registration statement be-
comes effective).
56 See note 47 supra.
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formation than could be sanctioned by the terms of rule 135,"7 but
Chris-Craft and the SEC challenged only "the most flagrant violation
of section 5(c)," the 80 dollar valuation estimate. The defendants
responded that the 80 dollar phrase was sanctioned by rule 135's
reference to "the basis" of the exchange.5 Neither Chris-Craft nor
the majority of the Second Circuit met this response head on, but
rather contended that the disclosures permitted by rule 135 were
"exclusive" and not an administrative attempt to list permissible dis-
closures which might be supplemented by a judicial rule of reason.59
Accepting the "exclusive checklist" argument and its policy justification
that such an objective standard provides certainty for the financial
community and the courts, neither of which was apparently challenged
by the defendants, the majority held that Bangor Punta's 80 dollar
value assessment was beyond the scope of preregistration information
privileged under rule 135. Without ever defining the "basis of the
exchange" phrase, the court found the May 8 press release violative
of section 5(c). Although admitting doubt as to the appropriate
construction of the phrase, Judge Lumbard in dissent read the 80
dollar figure as permitted by this phrase and, more importantly, com-
pelled by Texas Gulf Sulphur."0 Because the Second Circuit's dis-
agreement on rule 135 runs much deeper than a semantic dispute, the
rationale underlying the majority's narrow if not arbitrary construc-
tion and the dissent's uncertain but opposite result can best be under-
stood in the context of the need recognized by the entire court for a
consistent construction of section 5 (c) and rule 135.
In the exchange offer context, rule 135 typically comes into play
when an acquiring company announces its intention to offer a new
issue of its shares in exchange for those of the target company. When
the shares about to be registered and offered are identical to the
offeror's then widely traded and readily valued securities, rule 135's
"basis" phrase should allow disclosure of both the value of the offered
shares and the specified exchange ratio. But the Bangor Punta pre-
registration announcement was far more complicated: the number and
description of the securities to be included in the package were un-
known, the judgment of the First Boston Corporation was to be
substituted for the market evaluation mechanism, the characteristics
of the securities in terms of potential risk and return were not dis-
closed, and most important, the 80 dollar value was not certain but
merely a minimum valuation." If rule 135 permits this kind of
preregistration announcement, a premium is put upon nonpublic in-
formation and trading in target shares on incomplete information is
57 See note 25 supra & accompanying text.
G Brief for Bangor Punta Corp., Appellee at 23-24, Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v.
Bangor Punta Corp., 69-70 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1f 92,510 (2d Cir. 1970).
69 426 F.2d at 574.
60 Id. at 580-82.
61 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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encouraged. The majority of the Second Circuit recognized the danger
such a broad interpretation of rule 135 posed for section 5(c)'s
statutory scheme. In light of this danger, the court apparently felt
no obligation to discuss the defendant's "basis" arguments, but ruled
in essence that whatever the "basis" phrase means, section 5(c)'s
basic prohibitions against preregistration publicity must be preserved.
Judge Waterman summarized this position:
We need not reach the question whether prudent investors
would have [mis] construed the $80 value or whether it would
have been assumed, as was apparently the case, that the value
referred to was based on such considerations as Bangor
Punta's earnings and asset value as well as upon the sales
price of the securities. It is enough to point out that under
either construction the SEC had no way of checking the
honesty of the figure, and that the public did not receive the
detailed information it would have received from a prospectus
issued after a registration statement had been filed. Such
information would have eliminated the possibility, perhaps
the probability, that some persons would have construed the
$80 figure as referring to the market value when that value
was neither accurate nor intended.' 2
In spite of the court's failure to articulate its rationale, its holding
is essential if section 5 (c) is to be effective in cases like Chris-Craft
when there is a wide diversity in the information available to various
investors which cannot be narrowed by a rule 135 announcement
because publication of "the basis upon which the offer is proposed to
be made" necessarily involves estimates of value and not simply a
fixed exchange ratio. 3  But regardless of the consistency this inter-
pretation brings to section 5 (c) and rule 135, competing considerations
stemming from the 1934 Act's disclosure requirements may require
the opposite conclusion suggested by Chief Judge Lumbard.
B. Requirements of Disclosure Under Rule 10b-5 in the
Context of an Exchange Offer
Rule lob-5 promulgated by the SEC under section 10(b) of the
1934 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud,
62 426 F2d at 575.
63 Judge Lumbard notes that in these circumstances the "basis" of the proposed
exchange necessarily involves an estimate. Id. at 580 & n.1.
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(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 4
In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit construed rule lOb-5
broadly to require that those with inside information must either
disclose it or, if they choose not to or are disabled from doing so by
a corporate confidence, must refrain from trading. "Material" was
interpreted to mean influential in the decisions of investors actually
in the market. The phrase "in connection with" was construed to
require only that the public be trading the securities on an exchange."'
In the instant case, Bangor Punta and Piper were not accused of
failing to disclose all material information but precisely the opposite.
After reaching agreement on May 8, the defendants had two options
under Texas Gulf Sulphur: publish sufficient information to inform
the public fully, or remain silent.66 The court ruled that, because on
May 8 the defendants had not completed the details of their agreement
so that it might be brought within rule 135 's exclusive checklist, they
could disclose only the fact of the offer without reference to the 80
dollar value minimum. This approach ignores the second option-
remaining silent-an approach the SEC argued was dispositive of the
case. Indeed the entire court assumed that Piper and Bangor Punta
did not have the option to remain silent on May 8. Judge Lumbard
gave two reasons for this assumption. First, the number of Piper
and Bangor Punta employees with knowledge of the 80 dollar valua-
tion had increased so that "[e]ven if under some legal or moral duty
of restraint, a group this large could not be effectively policed or
controlled." 67 Second, if the defendants had not disclosed their agree-
ment, including the price they agreed on for the proposed offering,
Piper shareholders who tendered to Chris-Craft might, in both Judge
Lumbard and Judge Anderson's view, have had a cause of action
against Piper and Bangor Punta under rule lOb-5.6 These reasons
led both judges to conclude that regardless of the supervening restric-
tions of section 5 (c) of the 1933 Act, anything less than the May 8
press release would not have fully disclosed information that met the
6417 C.F.R. §240.!ob-5 (1970).
65 401 F.2d at 860.
66 Brief for the SEC, Amicus Curiae at 21, Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor
Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc). See also 426 F.2d at 580-81.
67426 F2d at 581.
681d. at 578-79, 581 n.3.
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investor-oriented test of materiality required by Texas Gulf Sulphur's
construction of rule lOb-5.
The majority did not dispute the conclusion that Bangor Punta
and Piper were compelled to disclose their May 8 agreement but,
because of its desire to achieve consistency between rule 135 and
section 5(c), refused to find the 80 dollar figure material within the
meaning of Texas Gulf Sulphur. Judge Waterman stated this
reluctance:
Bangor Punta and Piper argue that even prior to the
filing of a registration statement an immediate disclosure of
market value is compelled in cases such as this both by SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur . . . and by the rules of the New
York Stock Exchange. We do not agree. . . . Had Bangor
Punta observed Rule 135 by revealing immediately its in-
tention to make an exchange offer . . . adequate information
concerning the proposed transaction would have been placed
before the public . . ..
C. The Material Facts Doctrine and Section 13(d) of the
1934 Act
Judge Lumbard both defined the test for determining which pro-
vision of the securities law controls and framed the issue dividing the
court when he quoted the test of materiality set forth in Texas Gulf
Sulphur: "whether the fact is one to which '[a] reasonable man would
attach importance . . . in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question.' " " If this standard is applied in the instant
case, it is extremely difficult to avoid direct conflict with section 5 (c)
except by reading broadly the "basis" phrase of rule 135, a solution
already rejected. The assumption that a reasonable investor, although
recognizing the ambiguities of the 80 dollar figure, would nonetheless
find it significant in deciding whether to accept Chris-Craft's offer,
is justifiable but leads to permitting publicity contrary to the policy
of section 5 (c).
All members of the court viewed the need for disclosure as resting
upon the unfair advantage that knowledge of the 80 dollar figure was
likely to give two groups of investors: insiders (persons either party
to or involved in the Piper-Bangor Punta negotiations) and their
tipees; and institutional investors scrutinizing information filed with
the SEC under section 13(d) of the 1934 Act. Texas Gulf Sulphur
limits the activities of the first group, but the presence of the second
group injects a new element lying close to the center of the court's
disagreement. Section 13(d) requires that, when a person becomes
69 Id. at 575.
10Id. at 580 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)) (omissions by court in
Chris-Craft).
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the beneficial owner of ten percent or more of any class of a cor-
poration's stock, he must file a registration statement with the SEC
disclosing certain information about the transaction." In its. 13 (d)
statement, Bangor Punta declared its agreement to acquire the Piper
family's thirty percent holdings at 80 dollars per share conditioned
upon an identical offer to the public." But when information about
a forthcoming securities offering, the public disclosure of which is
prohibited by section 5(c), is incorporated in a section 13(d) state-
ment and thereby becomes public, trading in the target's shares (rights
to acquire the unregistered securities) begins-precisely contrary to
section 5(c). Because many plans for acquisition contemplate pur-
chases of ten percent of the target's shares prior to an exchange offer,7"
the section 13 (d) statement could readily be used to incorporate pre-
registration publicity in circumvention of section 5(c). In fact, an
acquiring corporation structuring the initial purchases to include a
conditional public offering might use the Texas Gulf Sulphur holding
to claim the right-indeed the legal compulsion-to publish this in-
formation immediately. In this situation, either the preregistration
silence required by section 5 (c) or the principle of fairness underlying
rule 10b-5's prohibition of insider trading must perforce be violated.
This, in fact, is exactly where the Second Circuit left the matter.
The majority achieved consistency between section 5 (c) and rule 135
only by discounting the risk of insider trading and trading by insti-
tutional investors 74 in comparison to the danger of misleading large
numbers of investors. Although Judge Lumbard would permit dis-
closure of the 80 dollar figure, he conceded that "[w] hen the securities
to be offered are not specified at the time of the announcement, the
investing public cannot even begin to make an independent evaluation
of the offer and perforce may tend to react significantly but blindly
to the unsupported dollar sum." " He further conceded that "there
71 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1) (Supp. V, 1970), discussed at note 10 supra.
72The "Schedule 13D" filed by Bangor Punta stated, inter alia:
Bangor Punta has agreed, subject to shareholder and regulatory approval,
with the [members of the Piper family] to make an exchange offer for ap-
proximately 501,000 shares of Piper Common Stock ....
Bangor Punta has agreed to seek shareholder and regulatory
approval to make a further exchange offer for any and all remaining Piper
stock on the basis of cash and/or securities having a value of at least $80
per share. Such value to be determined by The First Boston Corporation.
Supplemental Brief of Bangor Punta Corp. & David W. Wallace, Appellees, On
Reargument, Addendum at 2-3, Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp.,
426 F2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc) (emphasis supplied in brief).
73 See note 15 supra.
74426 F2d at 575-76. Chief judge Lumbard noted:
The 13(d) (1) statement was placed in the public files of the Commis-
sion, a repository over which, it is not unreasonable to assume, the keener
investment houses maintain a close scrutiny.
Id. at 581. Although such investors would probably be few in number, they have the
ability, which they would certainly exercise in case of a major development, to
purchase extremely large blocs of shares.
751d. at 580-81 (footnote omitted).
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is a possibility for abuse" 76 by corporate bootstrapping through the
use of agreements structured to fall within section 13(d)'s require-
ments but beyond section 5 (c)'s. However correct either the majority
or dissent may be on the law, their result seems wholly unsatisfactory.
D. The Need for Dual Standards
When the majority accepted the relevance of Texas Gulf Sulphur
and Judge Lumbard defined the issue in terms of that decision's
formulation of "materiality" in rule lOb-5, the court foreclosed the
most feasible solution to their dilemma. Texas Gulf Sulphur's defini-
tion of materiality arose in the absence of competing policies of non-
disclosure under the 1933 Act. Although in most instances the
standards for insider trading absent disclosure are identical with those
for disclosure itself, no compelling reason dictates this rule if its appli-
cation so tips the balance in favor of 1934 Act policies that those of
the 1933 Act must be subservient. Nor is there a compelling reason
why in the instant situation a corporation should not be required to
make an admittedly qualified and limited public disclosure while at
the same time its insiders are forbidden from trading. This approach,
precisely the one taken by rule 135, permits limited preregistration
disclosure designed to remove most of the advantage of those with
knowledge of the offer. Under a revised definition of materiality,
the courts could articulate a rule of limited though mandatory dis-
closure to immunize the offeror or the target's management against
suits by target shareholders who sold their shares without knowledge
of a more favorable offer to come. A revision of the "materiality"
doctrine for this purpose should have no impact upon the limited con-
struction of the "basis thereof" phase in rule 135 suggested above,
because rule 135 speaks to the limitation of disclosure only in the
specific context of offers to buy or sell securities. Although the line
drawn on such a standard might not differ radically from that actually
drawn in Chris-Craft, recognition that the limitation need not be tied
to the maximum limits of rule 135, plus awareness that compliance
with the minimum standards for corporate disclosure does not authorize
insider trading, would permit the court to balance the securities laws'
competing considerations.
Admittedly, the practical problems of policing insider trading
become more difficult if Judge Lumbard's application of the Texas
Gulf Sulphur test of materiality is not adopted in the context of an-
nouncements of forthcoming exchange offers. Perhaps the only feasible
alternative is a flat prohibition against trading by the offeror, not
only from the time the offer is announced as rule 10b-6 provides,7 7
76 Id. at 581.
7 7 Rule lOb-6 provides:
(a) It shall constitute a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance"
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but also from the time the offer is either agreed upon by offeror and
target managements or authorized by the offeror's shareholders."8
Public disclosure of a proposed securities offering through the
section 13(d) statement is another matter entirely-one which should
not be tolerated under any circumstances. Without reducing the
present requirements of 13(d), the SEC could promulgate rules limit-
ing disclosure of such extraneous information from its files either
absolutely or with the understanding that such information will not
be used when trading in target shares. Alternatively, notice of the
offering might be filed by the acquiring party as a supplement or
amendment to the 13(d) statement at the time the proposed offering
is registered under section 5(c).
CONCLUSION
Due to their increasing frequency, and the increasing fierceness
with which they are contested, exchange offers pose problems of grow-
ing importance and difficulty for effective securities regulation. The
provisions enacted for the control of disclosure, although generally
successful in other circumstances, appear insufficient and even self-
contradictory in this context. The source of this defect is also the
key to its solution: the test of "materiality," which brings the various
regulatory provisions into play, fails to distinguish adequately between
situations in which its purpose and effect differ widely. The test of
"materiality" determines what information, when in the possession of
"insiders," bars them from trading in the securities concerned. Under
another provision, "materiality" determines what information regard-
ing preliminary negotiations must be disclosed. These cases are quite
distinct, as are the questions to which they give rise. Failure to
distinguish between them necessarily impairs the ability of the securities
law to deal with them satisfactorily. Only when this is recognized
can securities regulation hope to fulfill the purposes for which it was
enacted.
as used in section 10(b) of the Act [of 1933] for any person,
(2) Who is the issuer . . .
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . to bid for
or purchase for any account in which he has a beneficial interest, any security
which is the subject of such distribution, or any security of the same class
or series, or any right to purchase such security ....
17 C.F.R. §240.10b-6 (1970) (emphasis added). The majority held that, after the
May 8 announcement of Bangor Punta's offer, Piper shares became rights to acquire
the new securities to be issued within the meaning of the rule. 426 F.2d at 577.
It also noted that the rise in the market price of Piper shares due to purchases by
Bangor Punta might be interpreted by small investors as indicative of a favorable
reaction to the Bangor Punta offer. Id.
7s Listing agreements with major securities exchanges and corporate charters, as
well as the law of most states, makes stockholder approval a prerequisite to the
issuance of new securities.
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